SitReps
SitRep, or situation report, was used widely in World War II by the military to describe anything from troop deployments to details of the aftermath of military conflicts. Another term that is commonly used to discuss an event after it has occurred is an After Action Report or After Action Review (AAR). State and federal agencies regularly release AARs related to mass shootings, many of which we provide on our resource page. We have designed our SitReps to shed light on the research and lessons learned from these attacks concerning behavioral threat assessment and physical safety and security measures.
It is important to say clearly, the blame lays squarely at the feet of the person or persons who planned and carried out the attack. DPrep Safety Division remains committed to reducing the contagion effect that comes from glorifying and naming the attackers.
The purpose of our SitRep reports is to provide a monthly update to the threat, BIT and CARE community on effective ways to prevent this violence from occurring in the future.
San Bernardino
Target: Inland Regional Center
Location: San Bernardino, CA
Date: December 2, 2015
Attackers: 28m & 29m
Victims: 14 Killed, 22 Injured
Islamic extremists attended a work training and holiday party at Inland Regional Center, left and returned in tactical clothing and shot numerous attendees, killing 14 and injuring 22. They planned to detonate an IED but were engaged in a subsequent vehicle pursuit and shootout, and both suspects were killed. They were found with AR-15s, semi-automatic pistols, and IEDs.
There has been an increase in recent years with attackers spending time researching and developing increased tactical abilities related to weapons systems, strategy and planning of their attacks. This attack involved a high degree of sophistication, including counter measures related to cell phone tracking and methodical planning. Law enforcement should be prepared to engage attackers with higher lethality weapons systems, ammunition, body armor and surveillance capabilities. This includes awareness of explosives, including secondary attacks on staging areas for first responders, such as delayed explosive devices placed prior to the attack. This was one of the tactics involved in this attack. Realigning and enhancing this response in collaboration with FBI, fusion centers, ATF, and state police will enhance the survivability of and safety of first responders in increasingly complicated threat environments.
Further Reading: Harm to Others and Ending Campus Violence, both by Dr. Brian Van Brunt
As with many attacks, the planning occurred privately with few opportunities for reports to police, a behavioral intervention team (BIT) or human resources. Colleges, K-12 schools, and workplaces should invest in the development of these teams and attend to early approach behaviors such as depression, isolation, fixation and focus on targets, grievance collection, leakage, and bullying/teasing as opportunities for early detection of potential violence to self or others.
Further Reading: ”Beyond the Red Flags” by Dr. Brian Van Brunt & Dr. Amy Murphy
Home grown attacks are much more common than coordinated attacks from outside the U.S. These single cell attacks may occur independently of larger terrorist networks and often depend on local resources and planning to carry out the attack. College and university campus law enforcement should attend to trends in extremist violence targeting the various religious groups, white supremacist ideology, and individuals focused on women as targets in incel related attacks.
Further Reading: ”Terrorist in Training” by Dr. Lisa Pescara-Kovach, Dr. Brian Van Brunt, & Dr. Amy Murphy; Understanding and Treating Incels by Dr. Chris Taylor & Dr. Brian Van Brunt; White Supremacist Violence by Dr. Brian Van Brunt, Dr. Lisa Pescara-Kovach, & Bethany Van Brunt; Audit of the Department of Justice’s Strategy to Address the Domestic Violent Extremism Threat
While we don’t want to focus most resources on outlier behavior, it is essential to review cases that may shed light on emerging trends. In this case, the female suspect was believed to have ties to extremists. Data supports males as the overwhelming drivers of these attacks. While female attackers and attackers with ties to overseas terrorism cells and more coordinated counter-surveillance measures are not common in mass shootings, understanding this as a potential escalating pattern is important to stay ahead of the attacker’s plans.
Those in a first response role found themselves experiencing sensory overload at they came into the scene. Preparation, planning, and training are critical to assist first responders to successfully engage and neutralize the threat. Understanding the building’s layout, particularly when there are multiple hallways in a large building like the Inland Regional Center. Likewise, having a clear and consistent approach to marking rooms clear will prevent the need to repeat clearing rooms (an element in this attack). Another element is coordination with first responders who may serve in a volunteer role or arrive in a personal vehicle. Having a clear plan for vehicles prior to an emergency event prevents blocking access, as occurred here and in numerous other attacks, including Aurora and the Naval Yard.
Further Reading: Colorado Theater Shooting Fast Facts from CNN; MPD Navy Yard After Action Report
The greatest cause for death following an active shooting is loss of blood. Training staff at schools, colleges, workplaces, community centers and sports/event facilities in Stop the Bleed has a drastic effect on keeping people alive by reducing bleeding until medical first responders arrives.