

Gateway Community Charters: Community Collaborative Charter School

TK-8, 3701 Stephen Drive, North Highlands
Sacramento Youth Center, 1901 Del Paso Boulevard, Sacramento



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Executive Summary

The Gateway Community Charters (GCC) Site Safety Report assesses the facility's current safety practices and infrastructure, providing actionable recommendations to enhance security, emergency preparedness, and operational efficiency. This report underscores the school's proactive approach to safeguarding its community.

Key Highlights

- **Shared Facilities:** CCCS-TK8 shares space with COA Middle School, creating unique safety and communication challenges. CCCS-SYC is a mixed-use space with community engagement programs.
- **Emergency Supplies:** Lockdown kits and first aid resources are present but inconsistently distributed, with gaps in accessibility and staff knowledge.
- **Camera Systems:** CCCS-TK8's outdated system requires repair, while CCCS-SYC lacks full exterior coverage.
- **Perimeter Security:** Both locations face challenges related to fencing, unhoused individuals nearby, and gate access.
- **Interior Access and Doors:** Widespread use of door props and inconsistent locking practices compromise security.
- **Communication:** Radios are available but lack compatibility between co-located sites. Duress alarms are either non-functional or absent.

Key Recommendations

- **Upgrade Camera Systems:**
 - Replace or repair outdated cameras at CCCS-TK8 and add coverage for key exterior areas at both sites.
 - Ensure at least 30 days of recorded footage and provide live access to local law enforcement during emergencies.
- **Enhance Access Control:**
 - Remove door props and ensure all doors are consistently closed and locked.
 - Install fencing or barriers that direct visitors to the main office at CCCS-TK8.
- **Expand Emergency Supplies and Training:**
 - Distribute lockdown buckets and first aid kits in all classrooms and shared spaces.
 - Provide all staff training on AED use, stop-the-bleed techniques, and choking response.
- **Improve Lighting:**
 - Install additional lighting at CCCS-TK8 to address dark walkways, stairwells, and parking areas.
 - Add back and side lighting for CCCS-SYC to enhance visibility and deter loitering.
- **Designate Safer Corners:**
 - Identify and mark safer corners in all classrooms with signage and emergency supplies.
- **Integrate Communication Systems:**
 - Address the radio compatibility issue between CCCS-TK8 and COA Middle School by upgrading or reprogramming devices.

- Install and test duress alarms, including mobile options for staff.
- Reinforce Perimeter Security:
 - Replace or reinforce damaged fencing at CCCS-TK8 and consider adding privacy screening near public parks.
 - Collaborate with local police and city officials to address issues with unhoused individuals near both sites.
- Enhance Signage:
 - Add wayfinding signage to improve navigation for first responders and visitors.
 - Ensure fencing and building signs are clearly visible from the street.

Background

On Monday, December 9th, safety experts Charlie Taylor and Scott Thorne visited the Community Collaborative Charter School TK-8 (CCCS-TK8). On Tuesday, December 10th, Charlie Taylor and Chris Usher visited the Sacramento Youth Center (CCCS-SYC). There are additional references to the COA Middle School, which is essentially co-located with CCCS and shares some space but will have an independent report. CCCS-TK8 is in the North Highlands area of Sacramento and serves students from transitional kindergarten through 8th grade. The Sacramento Youth Center is in the Old North Sacramento neighborhood, serves grades 9-12 in a hybrid in-person/online setting, and offers career and technical classes.

This survey is not meant to identify every potential hazard, safety concern, training need, or emergency supply requirement. While we have noted many positive aspects of your facility, this report focuses on areas that may require further attention. It is designed to assess your facility's current state and highlight areas for improvement based on the information provided.

Private and public organizations across America are responsible for providing safe and secure environments for work and learning. These are places where employees and students should feel protected from undue harm and risk. By conducting this vulnerability assessment, your facility is taking a proactive step toward enhanced safety.

This report provides an overview of your facility's current safety awareness, including findings and recommendations derived from on-site interviews, observations, and a review of materials provided by facility administrators.

Scope

The following activities are within the scope of this project:

- Interviews with key staff members responsible for policy, administration, day-to-day operations, facilities management, and safety.
- A visual walk-through of the facilities with administrative and facilities personnel to assess physical site safety.

The following activities are NOT part of this security assessment.

- Testing current facility-developed safety plans or emergency response plans.
- DPrep/WVPA did not independently verify information provided by employees.
- This security assessment does not include any aspect of IT/Cyber vulnerabilities, which should be assessed independently.

Disclaimer

Any action taken by a recipient of this report or by their representatives based upon this security assessment does not guarantee nor warrant in any way whatsoever that the assessed location(s), facility, its users, or visitors may or may not be rendered safer, invulnerable, or in any fashion impervious to successful penetration, attack, or other acts which could cause property damage and/or personal injury to the facility or its patrons. By accepting this security assessment report and/or by taking or avoiding taking any action based on its written or verbal content, Gateway Community Charters hereby agrees to release, waive, discharge, hold harmless, and not sue WVPA, DPrep Inc., any of their officers and/or employees, for any and all loss, harm, liability, or damage caused as a consequence of the security assessment, release of the written report, pictures, and assessors' opinions, including any loss arising from a claim of negligence. Further, by accepting this report, Gateway Community Charters agrees to indemnify WVPA, DPrep Inc, their agents, officers, and employees from any loss, harm, liability, lawsuits, damages, or costs, including court costs and attorney fees.


Facility-Wide Suggestions

Exterior Signage

Effective signage and wayfinding are fundamental to workplace security. They provide clear directions, identify hazards, and establish boundaries, thereby enhancing safety and preventing accidents. Strategically placed signs guide employees and visitors, reducing confusion and ensuring efficient evacuation during emergencies.¹ Signage and a well-maintained site also convey a sense of preparation and attention to detail that can deter crime or other hostile actions. Clear and sufficient signage aids emergency services personnel with improved navigation and timeliness of response during emergencies and other critical incidents.

The Center for Safe Schools suggests exterior signage should be: 1) visible from the street or nearest driveway, 2) contrasting with their background, and 3) reflective for low light or smoky conditions. All exterior doors should be numbered in sequential order in a clockwise manner, with the main entrance designated as number one.²

CCCS-TK8 has a sign in front of the building and signage on the front of the main office. The school also has a variety of external art and inspirational graphics on some exterior walls.



¹ American Society of Safety Professionals. (n.d.). Three ways signage can improve workplace safety. Retrieved December 1, 2024, from https://www.assp.org/news-and-articles/three-ways-signage-can-improve-workplace-safety?utm_source=chatgpt.com

² Center for Safe Schools (2024). Model Door and Window Classroom Numbering. Retrieved from <https://www.centerforsafeschools.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/CSS-Door-and-Window-Classroom-Numbering-2024.pdf>

Moving Forward:

- Consider adding additional signage on the perimeter fencing and a sign that can be clearly seen from the road.

CCCS-SYC is co-located with a community center and has signage on the large glass windows and front door. The facility also benefits from the large community center sign.



Cameras

Cameras play a vital role in safety by providing real-time surveillance that can help detect and deter potential threats, ensuring a quicker response to incidents. According to the U.S. Secret Service, monitored and strategically placed cameras are essential for identifying suspicious behavior and enhancing situational awareness in critical areas.^{3,4} Reviewing camera footage after the fact may provide investigative material or document a critical incident but will not aid in preventing an incident.

Cameras provide three general functions when it comes to safety and security.

1. Cameras record what occurred on-site during a hazard, conflict, theft, crime, or other critical event, providing detailed documentation and legal risk mitigation when assessing how employees handle critical incidents. The footage is helpful in training scenarios and as part of an after-event review.
2. Cameras deter those who may be engaged in penetration testing or assessing the site as a potential target. Multiple cameras and signage warnings about being recorded offer a level of hardening a target location that is part of a layered safety and security approach.
3. Cameras that are live monitored by office staff at their desks or broadcast to a larger screen in a public area increase situational awareness and response time when reacting to threats, physical altercations, or an active assailant. Providing this live feed link to local law enforcement improves their awareness when responding to a crisis on-site.

CCCS-TK8 staff noted that the system in use is outdated. Some cameras are broken, and some are vandalized, including one that was spray-painted. Staff indicated there was a plan to replace them and add additional cameras. COA Middle School also has cameras, but the systems are not shared.




3 U.S. Secret Service, National Threat Assessment Center. (2019). Protecting America's schools: A U.S. Secret Service analysis of targeted school violence. Retrieved from https://www.secretservice.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/Protecting_Americas_Schools.pdf

4 Alcatraz Lock. (n.d.). How CCTV cameras can help to prevent school shootings. Retrieved from <https://alcatrazlock.com/how-cctv-cameras-can-help-to-prevent-school-shootings/>

Moving Forward:

- It is recommended that the plan for replacement and additional cameras moving forward, with a staged model suggested:
 - Coverage across all areas.
 - Active monitoring of access in central locations (front desk and others) for better transparency.
 - Police access to the live feed during emergencies.
 - If possible, a shared system of cameras for CCCS TK-8 and the co-located COA Middle School would be ideal.
- Ideally, there should be at least 30 days of recorded footage.
- Consider working with local law enforcement to provide access via a secure link during emergencies.
- Confirm a schematic with all camera locations and coverage areas is available. An assessment should be conducted to confirm adequate coverage (DPrep Safety can assist in this process.)

The camera system at **CCCS-SYC** is monitored by leadership. There looks to be good coverage inside, but there is nothing on the front of the building, with only the alleyway and side street covered on the exterior. All cameras appear to be in good working order. There is no access for police currently.



Moving Forward:

- Consider camera coverage in the front of the building to provide additional awareness.
- Consider providing camera access to local police in the event of an emergency.
- Confirm a schematic with all camera locations and coverage areas is available. An assessment should be conducted to confirm adequate coverage (DPrep Safety can assist in this process.)

Emergency Medical Supplies/Lockdown Supplies

First aid response is dependent on two central concepts: materials and training. Having materials available without knowing how to use them is equally problematic as having people trained without providing access to materials. The American Red Cross recommends that first aid kits and AEDs (Automated External Defibrillators) be available in multiple locations and that all employees be trained in their use.⁵

The main office maintains an AED, Narcan, EpiPens, and a Cintas first aid kit (maintained monthly by the company). This is the only area where they are kept for the school. There are lockdown supplies at **CCCS TK-8** in the red buckets provided by the district, but not all classrooms appeared to have them. In some classrooms, the staff took some time to find them when asked.



Moving Forward:

- Consider adding additional AED and Cintas cabinets in the gym/cafeteria. These are shared spaces with COA Middle School and would benefit both.
- Ensure all classrooms and admin areas have a lockdown supply bucket or container. The district may have additional buckets available centrally. Consider assigning a staff member to monitor these and determine when supplies must be replaced. Ensure that staff know the locations of the supplies in their area. For the placement of buckets, see the section on [Safer Corners](#) in this report.
- While AEDs are useful emergency devices, another priority to invest in would be **stop-the-bleed/wound-packing** training for all staff. DPrep Safety offers this training, which would benefit all staff. The training and materials are central in responding to any active assailant or major injury. Blood loss is the leading cause of death during active shooting events. Example materials are included in [Appendix A](#).

⁵ American Red Cross. (n.d.). *Workplace safety training courses*. Retrieved December 1, 2024, from <https://www.redcross.org/take-a-class/organizations/workplace-safety>

- Likewise, training related to choking and some of the newer technology related to emergency response to choking should be a higher priority investment for the location. Example materials are included in [Appendix A](#).
- Invest in **several smaller first aid kits**, commonly known as 'boo-boo' kits, that would allow for more strategic placement around the facility, particularly in classrooms, and provide easier access to commonly used materials such as alcohol wipes and Band-Aids. Example materials are included in [Appendix A](#).
- Add **a first aid kit, a response kit for cutting and fire injuries, and a fire blanket** for the kitchen to have materials closer to where an injury might occur. Example materials are included in [Appendix A](#).
- Ensure all **staff are trained** on AED use, epi-pen usage, anti-overdose treatment, and basic first aid skills.

CCCS-SYC has two small first aid kits and two overdose response kits. There appeared to be no AED. Cintas is not contracted for first aid supplies at this location. There were no lockdown kits at this site.



Moving Forward:

- Consider adding an AED and a Cintas cabinet with their monthly service.
- Ensure that there are adequate lockdown supplies at this site. The district may have additional supplies available centrally. Consider assigning a staff member to monitor

these and determine when supplies need to be replaced. Ensure that staff know the locations of the supplies in their area.

- While AEDs are useful emergency devices, another priority to invest in would be ***stop-the-bleed/wound-packing*** training for all staff. DPrep Safety offers this training, which would benefit all staff. The training and materials are central in responding to any active assailant or major injury. Blood loss is the leading cause of death during active shooting events. Example materials are included in [Appendix A](#).
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- Add ***a first aid kit, a response kit for cutting and fire injuries, and a fire blanket*** for any kitchen to have materials closer to where an injury might occur. Example materials are included in [Appendix A](#).
- Ensure all ***staff are trained*** on AED use, epi-pen usage, anti-overdose treatment, and basic first aid skills.

Landscaping

According to the American Society of Landscape Architects, maintaining landscaping can enhance safety by creating clear sightlines, removing hiding spots, and creating opportunities for natural surveillance, all principles of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). Well-maintained landscaping can also reduce the perception of neglect, further aiding in crime deterrence.⁶

CCCS-TK8 has very little landscaping at this site. Trees and shrubs were trimmed within accepted CPTED limits, allowing for good sightlines and providing little opportunity for concealment. CPTED teaches a “2-foot, 6-foot” rule to keep a clear line of sight across the facility. This means shrubbery should be no higher than two feet, and tree canopies should be trimmed to hang no lower than six feet.

CCCS-SYC is in a more urban setting and has no landscaping near the building except trees on the street maintained by the city.




⁶ American Society of Landscape Architects. (n.d.). *Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) presentation*. Retrieved December 1, 2024, from https://www.asla.org/uploadedFiles/CMS/PPNs/Landing_Pages/ASLA_Urban_Design_PPN_CPTED_Presentation.pdf

Lighting

Lighting is important as it enhances natural surveillance by improving visibility at night, deterring potential offenders. According to the International CPTED Association, well-designed exterior lighting reduces dark areas and increases the likelihood of criminal activities being observed.⁷

There is very little lighting at **CCCS-TK8**. The only exterior lighting is along the covered walks outside the classrooms and some on the buildings. This leaves walkways, stairs, and the parking lot in darkness. Some fixtures (highlighted below left) did not have bulbs.



Moving Forward:

- Consider adding additional lighting to areas of concern and replacing/repairing existing lighting. Work with COA Middle School to determine shared concerns regarding lighting.

CCCS-SYC has storefront lighting and a large lighted sign on the front exterior. There is less lighting near the back and side of the building.



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Moving Forward:

- Consider additional lighting near the back and side of the building.


⁷ International CPTED Association. (n.d.). *Primer in CPTED – What is CPTED?*. Retrieved December 1, 2024, from <https://www.cpted.net/Primer-in-CPTED>

⁸ Retrieved January 2, 2025, from Google Maps.

Perimeter

Territorial reinforcement involves designing spaces to clearly define ownership, using elements like fences, signage, and landscaping to discourage unauthorized access and promote a sense of ownership by employees. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, establishing clear territorial boundaries enhances security by fostering ownership and responsibility among occupants.⁹

CCCS-TK8 has two types of fencing: chain link and anti-climb. Some of the chain link fences next to a paved recreational area have had to be repaired because people cut them to gain access to the property. Just outside the fence, there is a public park with clear evidence of an unhoused population (lower left photo). The staff told us that they had to move them from the area often. The outer fence has four gates that are always locked. The main entrance gate is controlled from the main office by a call button.



Moving Forward:

- Consider additional fence reinforcement or replacement for the chain link fence.
- Consider privacy screening on the fence near the public park.
- Continue to work with local police and city council to address the issue of unhoused people in the park.

⁹ Zahm, D. L. (2007). *Using crime prevention through environmental design in problem-solving*. U.S. Department of Justice. Retrieved from <https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/using-crime-prevention-through-environmental-design-problem-solving>

CCCS-SYC territorial reinforcement is achieved using colorful knee walls that denote the Youth center property (below left). This facility also struggles with the issue of unhoused people in the area. There does not appear to be an issue of unhoused people entering the school, but they frequently gather outside during the day, appear to spend the night there, and set fires for warmth.



Moving Forward:

- Continue to work with local police and city council to address the issue of unhoused people in the area.
- Staff expressed the desire for additional de-escalation training for working with the unhoused population (DPrep can provide this training, if desired).


Exterior Facility Access

Access Control

Access control is the ability to secure a site and regulate the keys and electronic systems that allow staff to access the worksite.¹⁰ Access control includes both after-hours and how employees and the public access the site during operation hours. Common systems include master keys and keys with more limited access, key fobs, locked doors, turnstiles, locked fences, sally ports/man traps, counters, and glass/plexiglass barriers.

CCCS-TK8 sits inside a fenced perimeter. The front office staff controls the main access gate remotely, but they have no direct view of it and rely on a camera. Once let in, visitors can access the entire school by bypassing the office. For those who check into the office, there is no process for logging visitors.

There is a Knox box on the front gate (highlighted below) for emergency services access. Access for the fire department is typically in a box with a red reflective marker, whereas for the police, it is typically blue, though, in some municipalities, these boxes can be a single color and offer access to all first responders.



Moving Forward:

- Consider additional fencing that directs visitors to the office, as well as a more robust system for
- Consider working with local emergency services to determine which currently have emergency access and add access for any that do not have it.

¹⁰ School Safety Working Group. (2020). Ten Essential Actions to Improve School Safety. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Department of Justice.

McPhaul, K., London, M., Murrett, K, Flannery, K, Rosen, J. and Lipscomb, J. (2008). Environment Evaluation for Workplace Violence in Healthcare and Social Services. Journal of Safety Research, 237-250.

CCCS-SYC emphasizes an open and welcoming atmosphere, and its policies and practices reflect this. They have a visitor log that appears to be well-maintained. By design, visitors can freely access the building once they have checked in.

Moving Forward:


- Since this facility differs from a traditional classroom building and due to the nature of its mission, we recommend they continue with their current philosophy of openness.

Doors & Windows

Implementing physical security measures like locked doors is fundamental in securing a workplace environment. Locked doors help prevent unauthorized access, protect sensitive information, and ensure the safety of employees and assets.¹¹

While **CCCS-TK8** sits inside a fenced perimeter, all exterior doors encountered were propped open. Staff have developed various ways to prop doors; some doors have built-in “kickstand” props. Many windows have security screening. The use of door props is problematic, as it allows the door to be accessed without control and conveys an unintentional message to the staff that propping open doors is a permissible practice in the facility. Propping doors and unsecured pass-through doors have been noted in recent school shootings as ways an attacker has gained access to a facility or has been more easily able to move through the facility.

The door to the dumpster area was held open in the kitchen area (lower left photo). Because the fire marshal removed the area's outer gate, the propped door allowed anyone to wander into the school. The principal spoke to the staff, but when we left, we noticed it propped open again. This is a major concern; the dumpster area also houses a very large propane tank and transformer and should be closed off from the public.



¹¹ National Center for Education Statistics. (1998). *Creating safe and drug-free schools: An action guide - Chapter 5: School security technology*. Retrieved December 1, 2024, from <https://nces.ed.gov/pubs98/safetech/chapter5.asp>

Moving Forward:

- Since there are known gaps in perimeter security, all doors should be closed and locked during school hours.
- Remove built-in door props from doors that have them and remove any wedges or other items used to prop doors open.
- Consider adding additional security, including a prop alarm for the door that exits the kitchen.
- Consider working with the fire marshal to determine approved methods for closing access to the dumpster area.

Doors at **CCCS-SYC** were well-maintained and generally locked. The center has a café that is open to the public, and one of the side doors was unlocked.

**Moving Forward:**

- Create a system to ensure that all doors meant to be locked during the day are locked.

Roof Access

Roof access, while needed for maintenance, can be problematic if it is accessible to others intent on bad acts or who may put themselves in a dangerous situation, increasing risk and liability for the facility.¹²

CCCS-TK8 has no roof access points inside the buildings, but they have issues with people climbing onto the roof. Some places have been fenced off to stop this; however, there are other unaddressed areas. There is climbable fencing that could provide access to a low roof (below right) and, from there, the roofs of other buildings. Some dumpsters can be used to access the roof.



Moving Forward:

- Secure the dumpsters so that they cannot be rolled closer to the building and used to access the roof.
- Address the remaining areas where people access the roof with additional fencing or other barriers.

CCCS-SYC has no exterior roof access and nothing readily climbable for access. There is one interior access point that was locked.





¹² Utah State Board of Education. (2019). *School safety*. Retrieved December 1, 2024, from <https://schools.utah.gov/schoollandtrust/resources/02.2019.SchoolSafety.pdf>

Facility Interior

Doors

Locked interior doors are vital for workplace security because they prevent intruders from freely accessing the facility. By limiting internal movement, they help protect sensitive information, assets, and ensure employee safety. Implementing access controls like locked interior doors is essential for safeguarding organizational assets.¹³

The majority of doors at **CCCS-TK8** were open, unlocked, or propped. Some doors were blocked by stored materials. There was also inconsistent locking hardware.




Moving Forward:

- Ensure that all doors are always free of obstruction.
- Consider locking interior doors to impede access for any potential intruder.
- Consider standardizing door locking hardware for consistency in maintenance and use.

¹³ National Institute of Standards and Technology. (1995). *An introduction to computer security: The NIST handbook* (NIST Special Publication 800-12, Chapter 15). Retrieved from <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-12/800-12-html/chapter15.html>

CCCS-SYC interior doors were well-maintained but generally open. This is likely owing to the mixed-use nature of the facility.



Moving Forward:

- Consider determining whether a welcoming atmosphere can be maintained while locking some interior doors to impede access for any potential intruder.

Interior Signage

Signage in the building conveys a sense of order, preparedness, and professionalism to visitors and those who may look to cause harm to the facility. The Center for Safe Schools offers the following guidelines for interior door numbering: 1) always place them on the hinge side of the door near the bottom so they can be viewed in smokey conditions, 2) contrast with their background, and 3) be retroreflective for low light and smokey conditions.¹⁴ This helps emergency responders and those evacuating navigate the space during a critical incident.

The **CCCS-TK8** classrooms are labeled with the building letter and room number. There is little to no interior wayfinding.



Moving Forward:

- Consider large, clearly marked signs so emergency responders can respond more quickly to where they are needed.
- Consider signage to direct individuals to each building.

CCCS-SYC has numerous rooms, which can be a bit difficult to navigate. There is some wayfinding signage.



¹⁴ Center for Safe Schools (2024). Model Door and Window Classroom Numbering. Retrieved from <https://www.centerforsafeschools.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/CSS-Door-and-Window-Classroom-Numbering-2024.pdf>

Moving Forward:

- Consider additional interior wayfinding signage to better guide first responders and students or staff new to the building.

Electrical Panels and Utility Areas

Implementing physical access controls for sensitive areas is essential for protecting organizational assets and ensuring safety. Securing utility areas prevents unauthorized individuals from tampering with critical systems like electrical, plumbing, and HVAC equipment, reducing the risk of accidents, service disruptions, and security breaches.¹⁵

At both **CCCS-TK8** and **CCCS-SYC**, few of the panels were locked, and some utility rooms were open. Utility areas were often blocked with stored materials.



Moving Forward:


- Ensure that all utility areas and panels are locked and the keys are secured.
- Remove all stored items from utility areas that impede door or utility access.

¹⁵ National Fire Protection Association. (n.d.). *NFPA 730: Guide for premises security*. Retrieved from <https://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/nfpa-730-standard-development/730>

Windows and Window Coverings

Windows enhance natural surveillance by allowing visibility into and out of a building, thereby deterring potential offenders. According to the International CPTED Association, properly designed and placed windows can increase security by promoting observation, while window coverings can balance privacy needs.¹⁶ Window coverings are also important during active assailant incidents to provide concealment from the attacker. Temporary coverings are preferable to permanent ones to allow monitoring of classroom activities and prevent unauthorized use of empty classrooms.¹⁷

The majority of windows at **CCCS-TK8** had coverings, but some were not in use. Some windows also had security grids, as noted earlier. Most classroom doors do not have embedded windows.



Moving Forward:

- Consider using existing window coverings and installing window coverings where there are none.
- A cost-effective solution may be reflective window film, allowing students and staff to see out but impeding anyone from seeing in.

¹⁶ International CPTED Association. (2020). *What is CPTED?* <https://cpted.net/what-is-cpted>

¹⁷ Keehan, A. (2023). Secure Classroom Doors to Stop Active Shooters. Retrieved on November 15, 2024 from <https://www.ue.org/risk-management/premises-safety/secure-classroom-doors-to-stop-active-shooters/>

CCCS-SYC is in a former storefront and has large front windows. These spaces are not traditional classrooms, so they do not have traditional classroom-style windows.



Moving Forward:

- Consider reflective film for the large front windows.

Safer Corners

Designating "*safer corners*"—areas within rooms that offer protection and are not visible from doorways—is important for enhancing occupant safety during emergencies. According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, identifying secure locations within a building can increase personal safety during incidents like active shooter situations.¹⁸

Safer corners are considered essential for school safety, based on lessons learned from previous school shootings, such as the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School incident.¹⁹

No safer corners are designated at either **CCCS-TK8** or **CCCS-SYC**.



These photos provide an example of a safer corner marked with the school's mascot. These low-cost/no-cost safety measures should be tied to a larger training program to ensure the practices are understood by all staff and are put into place consistently across the GCC community.

Moving Forward:

- Designate safer corners in each classroom and create a policy that lockdown supplies are to be kept in these areas. These areas can be designated with a picture of the mascot so that children of all ages can be aware of the areas. This should be accompanied by additional training and align with the Comprehensive School Site Safety Plan (CSSP).
- Consider assigning responsibility to an individual or department for maintaining safer corners and ensuring proper signage.
- Consider storing basic emergency supplies in each safer corner.
- Consider reviewing possible locations and create additional safer spaces.
- Consider locating any communications (classroom phone) in the safer corner.

¹⁸ U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2015). *Active Shooter Emergency Action Plan Guide*. <https://www.dhs.gov/publication/active-shooter-emergency-action-plan-guide>

¹⁹ New Hampshire Department of Safety. (2019). *Recommendations: Hard corners*. Retrieved from <https://schoolsafetyresources.nh.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Recommendations-Hard-Corners.pdf>

Visibility

Natural surveillance is a CPTED concept that involves designing and positioning features and people to enhance visibility and make it easier to observe activities. The goal is to remove potential hiding spots and improve the ability of authorized personnel to monitor and respond effectively. This approach helps deter aggressive behaviors by increasing the likelihood of detection and enhancing the sense of safety.²⁰

There are good sightlines inside the fenced perimeter at **CCCS-TK8**, and there are few areas for potential concealment. There are no typical hallways, as most classrooms open directly to the outside.



Similarly, **CCCS-SYC** has good sightlines both outside and inside the building.



²⁰ National Center for Injury Prevention and Control (U.S.). Division of Violence Prevention. (2017). Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) School Assessment (CSA).

Communication

The ability to communicate with staff, administrators, and teachers throughout the school during a critical incident requires each staff person to have access to a two-way radio, with appropriate training on how to use this radio and which channels should be utilized.

CCCS-TK8 has ample radios, and each staff member carries one. They do not share radios with the co-located COA Middle School, as they are different brands. They rely on texting when one building locks down or has another emergency.



Moving Forward:

- There are a few options for addressing this:
 - Consider purchasing additional radios to for a shared channel between the two co-located schools (CCCS-TK8 and COA Middle School). We suggest choosing one of two brands of radios currently used, perhaps whichever is newer, and purchasing additional radios to supply the co-located school. The other set of radios could be used at a district school that does not have them.
 - If this is not feasible, it is likely that the existing radios can be reset to share an emergency channel. This presents a training issue in that staff must learn added steps that may impede speed during an emergency.

CCCS-SYC uses radios but stated they do not have enough for all staff.



Moving Forward:

- Consider adding additional radios.

Duress Alarms

Providing staff with access to duress alarms (more commonly known as 'panic' alarms) helps improve emergency service reaction time during a critical incident.²¹ Ideally, there should be several of these alarms, some stationary and some mobile (to be used during tense meetings or customer interactions). These alarms should be tested quarterly to ensure they are in proper working order. Staff should be trained to understand how and when to use the alarm and who the alarm notifies.

CCCS-TK8 has what the staff believes to be an alarm or building alert system (pictured below), but it has never been tested and is possibly a relic from the previous school that occupied the space. There are no desk-based or personal duress alarms.

CCCS-SYC does not have duress alarms currently.



Moving Forward:

- Consider testing the existing system at **CCCS-TK8** to determine whether it is working and what specifically it does. Local police should be contacted to make them aware of the test.
- Mobile panic or duress buttons may be an investment to review through the alarm company used by GCC.
- Explore software-based panic/duress alarms at each of the computer terminals.
- Consider training for staff, including where the signal goes when they are used and the need for quarterly testing.

²¹ Hattersley, R. (2024). More Campuses Adopting Panic Alarm Tech, Most Satisfied with System Performance. Published by Campus Safety Magazine. <https://www.campusafetymagazine.com/insights/more-campuses-adopting-panic-alarm-tech-but-satisfaction-with-system-performance-is-slipping/161115/>

Additional Information and Recommendations

- Since **CCCS-TK8** is co-located with COA Middle School and they have shared space, we suggest overlapping protocols, communication, and regular safety meetings (perhaps quarterly) involving the administration of both schools.

Appendix A: Sample Products

Medical

- Smaller “boo-boo” first aid kits: [Johnson & Johnson Travel Ready Portable Emergency First Aid Kit](#)
- Tourniquet: [Stop The Bleed® Basic Kit with CAT Tourniquet](#)
- Wound packing: [Critical Essentials Bleeding Control Kit for Chest & Limb Wounds](#)
- Security seals for AEDs: [Security Control Locks](#)
- Overdose kits: [Naloxone Overdose Emergency Kit Cabinet](#) and [Narcan medication](#)
- Anti-choking kits: [VitalVac](#), [LifeVac](#) and [Arixmed](#)

Fire

- Fire blanket: [Prepared Hero Emergency Fire Suppression Blanket for Kitchen](#)

Lockdown/Barricade

- Window pulls: [Nightlock window shade](#) and [Hideaway Helper window shade](#)
- Door locking devices: [TeacherLock](#), [SAFEbolt](#), [Brinks door security bar](#), [Door armor max](#), [DoorJammer Lockdown](#), [The Boot](#), [Bolo Stick](#), [Rhino Ware](#)
- Mobile panic/duress apps: [SHEQSY app](#), [Blackline Safety](#), [OK Alone](#), [Lone Worker app](#)
- Summary article on panic/duress alarms: [Deepdive: 2023 Panic Alarm and Mobile Duress Systems and Apps](#)